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RECENT CASES
sequential damages.0 The opposite view is characterized by a Nebraska case
holding that "when plaintiff returned shoes and received payment for the
purchase price, it was an irrevocable election to rescind, and her statement
that she would see the defendants later about her injuries was ineffectual to
modify or disaffirm her election to rescind." 10
The doctrine of election of remedies has been said to rest upon the principle
"he who seeks equity must do equity"."i In a United States Supreme Court
decision it was stated that the doctrine of election of remedies was a harsh
and largely obsolete rule, the scope of which should not be extended.1 In
the Uniform Commercial Code there is no mention of "election" of any sort.
Section 2-608 of the Uniform Commercial Code eliminates the require-
ment that the buyer must elect between rescission and recovery of damages
for bieach of warranty. The remedy under this section is simply referred to
as "revocation of acceptance'.., Under this principle the buyer may not
only revoke passage of title but may also recover damages for non-delivery.14
The measure of damages for non-delivery is "the difference between" the
market price "at the time the buyer learned of the breach and the contract
price together with incidental and consequential damages".13 Incidental
damages includes expenses incurred in the "handling of rejected goods" and
consequential damages include "injury to person or property proximately
resulting from any breach of warranty".16 This would include the damages
asked in the instant case.
In view of the materials discussed it appears that the mere return of de-
fective goods purchased does not raise a conclusive presumption of an intend-
ed rescission which would prevent an action for damages.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - ACCIDENTS "ARISING OUT OF EMPLOY-
MENT" - IDIOPATHIc FALLS. - Plaintiff, who suffered from epilepsy, was
going about his customary duties in defendant's factory when he experi-
enced a seizure which caused him to fall and strike his head on the con-
crete floor, thus incurring a cerebral concussion. The Division of Work-
men's Compensation granted an award in favor of the claimant. On final
appeal to the Supreme Court it was held, three justices dissenting, that
the award be set aside. The concrete floor of the plant did not consti-
9. Bagwell v. Susman, 165 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1947).
10. Henry v. Budge & Guenzel Co., 118 Neb. 260, 224 N.W. 294, 296 (1929).
11. Peters v. Bain, 133 U.S. 670, 695 (1889).
12. Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U.S. 207 (1918).
13. U.C.C. §2-608(1) (1952) "The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or com-
mercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted
it."
14. Id. at §2-711(1) "Where . . . the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes
acceptance . . . the buyer may . . . (b) recover damages for non-delivery
15. Id. at §2-713(1).
16. Id. at §2-715(1) "Incidental damages resulting from the deller's breach include
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of
goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in
connection with effecting cover and any damages from delay or otherwise resulting from
the breach. (2) Consequential damages include (a) any loss resulting from general or
particular requirements and needs of which the seller . . . had reason to know . . . (b)
injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty".
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tute a hazard of employment which contributed to the accident. The
risk to which the employee was subjected did not arise from the nature
of the flooi or its quality of 'hardness", but was created solely by his pe-
culiar affliction. Henderson v. Celanese Corp., 108 A.2d 267 (N.J. 1954).
The jurisdictions are in general agreement that no injury' may be com-
pensable unless it resulted from an accident 2 "arising out of and in the
course of the employment." To make the task of construction easier the
expression has been divided 4; the "arising out of" phrase referring to the
causal origin, 5 and "course of employment" relating to time, place and
circumstances of the accident in relation to the employment., In the idio-
pathic fall cases the courts have had little difficulty in finding that the
accidents arose in the course of employment; the problem has been
whether the injury arose out of the employment.7  Generally an injury
arising out of the employment where there is a causal connection be-
tween the conditions under which the work is required to be performed
and the resulting injury.8
Thc courts have been almost unanimous in holding that an employee
is not precluded from receiving compensation merely because the injury
suffered is the aggravation or acceleration of a pre-existing disease or
infirmity 9; they do, however, require that the aggravation or acceleration
must have arisen out of the employment under circumstaices which can be
said to be accidental.10 Illustrative of this is the case of an employee who
has a dormant stomach cancer and because of over exertion in the course of
his employment suffers an activation thereof."1
Recovery has been allowed in fall cases where an employee because of a
pre-existing disease or physical weakness fell from a height,12 or in falling
1. Under Workmen's Compensation Acts, "injury" is designated as "accident" to dis-
tinguish it from intentional injuries and injuries caused by disease. Gates v. Central City
Opera House Ass'a, 107 Colo. 93, 108 P.2d 880 (1940).
2. "Accident", a word which in some form appears in most statutes, means an "un-
looked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed." The re-
quirement that the injury be accidental in character has been adopted either legislatively or
judicially by all states except California, Iowa, Massachusetts and Rhode Island. The
United States Employees Compensation Act also omits the requirement. 1 Larson, Work-
men's Compensation Law §§37.09, 37.10 n.2 (1952).
3. The "arising out of and in the course of employment" phrase has been adopted by
41 states. North Dakota, (N.D. Rev. Code (1943) Title 65) Pennsylvania, Texas, Wash-
ington and the U.S. Employee's Compensation Act omitted the "arising out of" idea com-
pletely. The other three states have either variants of the term or have changed the word-
ing to require that the injury arose out of or in the course of employment. 1 Larson, Work-
men's Compensation Law §6.10 (1952).
4. 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensatinn Law §6.10 (1952).
5. Beh v. Breze, 2 N.J. 279, 66 A.2d 156 (1949); Geltman v. Reliable Linen &
Supply Co., 128 N.J.L. 443, 25 A.2d 894 (1942).
6. Irwin Neisler & Co. v. Industrial Comm., 846 Ill. 89, 178 N.E. 357 (1931); Casey
v. Hansen, 238 Ia. 62, 26 N.W.2d 50 (1947).
7. See New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hoage, 62 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1932); United
States Casualty Co. v. Richardson, 75 Ga. App. 496, 43 S.E.2d 793 (1947).
8. Prosser on Torts §69 (1940).
9. 1 Larson, Wcrkmen's Compensation Law §12.20 (1952).
10. American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Industrial Comm., 59 Ariz. 87, 123 P.2d 163
(1942); Chicago & Alton Ry. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 310 I11. 502, 142 N.E. 182 (1924);
Hemphill %. Tremont Lumber Co., 209 La. 885, 24 So.2d 633 (1945); Mager v. State
Workmen's Ins. Fund, 127 Pa. Super, 438, 193 At. 155 (1937).
11. Causey v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 191 So. 730 (La. App. 1939).
12. Robinson-Pettet Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Bd., 201 Ky. 719, 258 S.W. 318 (1924)
(Compensation allowed where an employee was injured in fall from a ladder caused by
tuberculosis of the spine); Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co. v. Industrial Comm., 212
Wis. 227, 247 N.W. 841 (1933).
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struck a bookcase,- motor box, 14 sawhorse 1 5 or a piece of machinery, 16 gen-
erally on the theory that the employment put the employee in a position
increasing the dangerous effects of such a fall.
In cases of the instant type, where the employee has a pre-existing dis-
ease aggravated or accelerated in no way by the employment, and where
the fall is due to the disease and results in striking the bare floor instead of
an object incidental to. his work, the courts are divided as to whether the
injury is compensable. Those denying compensation do so on the theory that
a floor presents no risk or hazard that is not encountered everywhere, by all
members of the public. 1 7 Those allowing recovery do so on the theory that
the hazard need not expose the employee to extraordinary risk; rather, the
fact that the hazard is incidental to and growing out of the employment is
sufficient for compensation.' 8 One writer contends that the majority of the
recent decisions allow recovery in level floor idiopathic cases. 19 A careful
study of the decisions cited in support of this view, however, will show that
many of these cases involve unexplained falls,20 or that some factor peculiar
to the employment contributed to the injury.2'
"Why epileptics . . . falling on concrete floors, should be relegated to the
charity scrap-heap, for fractured skulls caused by contacts with floors, while
courts at the same time correctly make industry pay for such injuries if the
contact is with a wooden stairway, or a box, etc., is hard to understand. It
is a distinction without a difference, justified by no language in a remedial
statute intended to widen, not decrease the rights of the injured workman." 22
13. Tavey v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 106 Utah 489, 150 P.2d 379 (1944).
14. Varao's Case, 316 Mass. 363, 55 N.E.2d 451 (1944).
15. National Automobile & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 75 Cal. App. 2d
677, 171 r.2d 594 (1946).
16. Industrial Comm. v. Nelson, 127 Ohio St. 41, 186 N.E. 735 (1933).
17. Rozeck'i Case, 294 Mass. 205, 200 N.E. 903 (1936); Stanfield v. Industrial
Comm.. 146 Ohio 583, 67 N.E.2d 446 (1946); Daub v. Industrial Comm., 57 N.L.2d
:301 (Ohio App. 1943); Remington v. Louttit Laundry Co., 77 R.I. 210, 74 A.2d 442
(1950).
18. Savage v. St. Aeden's Church, 122 Conn. 343, 189 AtI. 599 (1937); Pollack v.
Studebaker Corp., 97 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. App. 1951); Barlau v. M.M.P. Implement Co.,
214 Minn. 564, 9 N.V.2d 6 (1943); General Ins. Corp. v. Wickersham, 235 S.W.2d 215
(Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
19. Horovitz, Current Trends in Workmen's Compensation 651 (1947).
20. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hoage, 62 F.2d 468 (D.C.Cir. 1932) (unexplained
fall); Savage v. St. Aeden's Church, 122 Conn. 343, 189 Atl. 599 (1937) (cause of Yall
unknown); Pollack v. Studebaker Corp., 230 Ind. 622, 97 N.E.2d 631 (1951) (unex-
plained fall); Barlau v. M.M.P. Implement Co., supra note 18 (unexplained fall); General
Ins. Corp. v. Wickersham, supra note 18 (employee may have struck cigar counter as he
fell). "It should be stressed . . . that thu present question [idiopathic falls], although
often discussed in tho same breath with unexplained falls, is basically quite different, since
in the unexplained-fall cases you begin with a completely neutral origin of the mishap
while in the present question you begin with an origin which is admittedly personal and
which therefore reonies some definite and affirmative employment contribution to offset the
prima facie showing of personal origin." 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law §12.11
(1952).
21. Protecto Awning Shutter Co. v. Clne, 154 Fla. 30, 16 So.2d 342 (1944) (An old
man, subject to fainting spells, fainted and fell to a concrete floor, fracturing his skull. The
basis for recovery was that the employment increased the probability of injury. Had he
been home the injury would have been less likely to happen); A. C. Lawrence Leather Co.
v Barnhill, 249 Ky. 437, 61 S'W.2d 1 (1933) (Employee after a day of stacking 200-lb.
sacks became dizzy on his way to his car and fell, breaking his leg. Injury was caused by
the conditions of the employment); Hall v. Doremus, 114 N.J.L. 47, 175 AtI. 369 (1934)
(While working employee became sick and faint from watching a difficult delivery of a
calf).
22. HGrovitz, Current Trends in Workmen's Compensation 652 (1947).
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Statements such as this sound very convincing in view of the fact that the
purpose of a Workmen's 'Compensation Act is to increase the protection of
employees against the hazards of industry2 3 However, one must not lose
sight of the fact that the compensation act imposes strict liability on the
emplcyer but was not intended to make the employer an absolute insurer
of the employee's safety, or to provide general health or accident insur-
ance.2 4 As one writer has said, "rules of law must, by their very nature,
proceed by categories . . ." Lines must be drawn between what is com-
pensable and what is not. 25 There must be some criterion for granting
recovery and as the majority of jurisdictions are unwilling to accept the
"hardness" of the floor as a factor in determining recovery, 26 a reasonable
solution seems to be the retention of the distinction between level falls and
falls into projecting objects which are incidental to the employment, or falls
from heights.27 In the latter two classes of falls the employment has placed
the employee in a position which increased the danger created by his pre-
existing disease. While it seems at first glance that there is some trend
toward the granting of recovery in the level fall cases, the majority of the
jurisdictions will not allow recovery unless the employment created or in-
tensified the risk that arose from the natural cause.
2 8
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23. Thompson v. J. A. Jones Const. Co., 199 S.C. 304, 19 S.E.2d 226 (1942).
24. Wade v. Pacific Coast Elevator Co., 64 Idaho 176, 129 P.2d 894 (1942); Muller
Construction Co. v. Industrial Board, 283 Ill. 148, 118 N.E. 1028 (1918); The whole
theory and purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act was to charge upon Industry as
one of the necesiary elements of cost in the production of goods, losses sustained by work-
men in their employment. O'Brien v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 192 Wash. 55, 72 P.2d 602
(1937); It was never intended to make the Workmen's Compensation Law an accident
insurance or health insurance measure. Booke v. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 70 N.D.
714, 297 N.W. 779 (1941); see Prosser on Torts §69 (1940).
25. 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 112.14 (1952).
26. Andrews v. L. & S. Amusement Corp., 253 N.Y. 97, 170 N.E. 506 (1930); Cin-
mino's Case, 251 Mass. 158, 146 N.E. 245 (1925); See note 17 supra.
27. See 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 166 (1952).
28. See notes 20, 21 and text material thereto.
